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Foreword

W

e often think of immigration as an urban phenomenon. We picture families with suitcases arriving by boat to Ellis Island and settling in New
York and other cities that promised employment and reconnection with family members and others of similar ethnic origin, urban enclaves of newcomers looking for a new lives and
opportunities. In this report, Leif Jensen describes a diﬀerent pattern of immigration in the 21st century, examining the
growing numbers of immigrants who are choosing to settle
in rural places and small towns where their presence brings
new faces and diverse culture to places where everyone often
knows everyone else, and knew their Daddy and Mama too.
Many rural leaders hope these new rural residents, bringing youth and determination, new skills and cultures, will
help to revitalize those rural communities struggling with low
incomes, a low-skill labor force, an aging population base,
limited access to services, and weak infrastructure. These
new Americans, like the waves of immigrants before them,
may come to join the middle class, providing new vitality for
small town civic life, new support for the tax base, new and
improved services, and better education systems.
However, long term residents may not be so sure of these
beneﬁts. They may worry about the social and economic impact of immigrants who bring with them diﬀerent languages,
racial makeup, and class standing. Sullivan County in the
Catskills of New York, depicted in the report by writer Julie
Ardery, illustrates these dynamics. Will Hispanic immigrants
to Sullivan County help the area rebound from a collapsed
tourist industry and become absorbed into the community, or
will they continue to be treated as invisible as they go to their
hard work each day in the Foie Gras factories and elsewhere?
Certainly, whatever the outcome, we can see that rural
communities are changing as more and more new immigrants
arrive and settle in small town America. As one immigrant to
Sullivan County says, “We’re not leaving.”
This report, New Immigrant Settlements in Rural America,
examines the implications of these settlements to rural America. Immigration has a big impact in places where population
is low and where more limited resources and social service
infrastructures make rural areas especially vulnerable to the
costs of new immigrant ﬂows. This report describes immigrants moving in to rural communities, considers the implications for communities, and describes some on the ground

cases where rural people are working to build stronger communities with the new Americans who are coming to their
small towns.
The Carsey Institute’s Center on Rural Families and
Communities has produced this report for our series, Reports
on Rural America, with support from the Annie E. Casey, W.
K. Kellogg, and Ford Foundations. This report contributes
to the Carsey Institute’s goal of building awareness and understanding of rural families and communities and stimulating fresh thinking about eﬀective rural policy and programs
that invest in those families and communities. We thank Leif
Jensen for his analysis of new immigration to rural America. We appreciate thoughtful reviews by Ken Johnson and
William Kandel, and thank our editors, Amy Seif here at
Carsey and Barbara Ray.
In writing this report the author, Leif Jensen, conducted
original analysis of data from the U.S. Census Bureau, and
relied on the published work of a number of scholars who
have contributed greatly to our understanding of this issue.
In assembling this report, Jensen relied on the infrastructural
support of the Population Research Institute at Penn State,
which has core support from the National Institute of Child
Health and Human Development (1 R24 HD1025 and 2 R24
HD041025-06), and The Pennsylvania State University Agricultural Experiment Station Multi-state Research Project
(NE-1011) on Rural Communities, Rural Labor Markets,
and Public Policy. The assistance of Tse-Chuan Yang, Jeanne
Spicer and Steve Graham, all at Penn State, is gratefully acknowledged by the author.
—Cynthia M. Duncan
Director, Carsey Institute
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Executive Summary

This report examines recent immigrants in rural and small
town America, through analysis of data from the U.S. Census
Bureau. For many decades urban areas have been, and they
remain, the destination of choice for the nation’s immigrants.
Recent evidence suggests, however, that many immigrant
groups are dispersing away from traditional gateway cities.
Many small towns and cities in every region of the country are
contending with new challenges and opportunities brought
by rapid increases in their immigrant populations.
To inform policy discussions of this important issue the
report:
• Places the latest wave of immigration to the United
States in historical and policy context;
• Calls attention to prevailing evidence on the residential
preferences of the foreign born, including their movement away from metropolitan areas and their segregation from the native born in regards to neighborhood of
residence;
• Pinpoints geographically and describes socio-economically places across the vast expanse of rural America
that have received relatively large inﬂuxes of recent
immigrants; and,
• Compares the characteristics of recent immigrants
in rural areas both to their native-born counterparts
in those areas, and to their foreign-born counterparts
living in more urban locales.
The report suggests that while immigrants are still highly urban in their residential location, there is evidence of
deconcentration, particularly to areas at the periphery of
traditional settlement areas. However, rural counties with
relatively high inﬂows of recently arrived immigrants can be
found throughout the country. This includes, for example, a
clear swath of counties in North Carolina and elsewhere in the
Southeast, a pocket of counties in interior south Florida, rural
counties in Arkansas and east Texas, counties along the Rio
Grande, several pockets throughout the Heartland and upper
Great Plains, and in the Mountain West and West Coast.
The industrial base of these rural counties suggest
recent immigrants are drawn to opportunities in meat
packing and other food processing and agricultural sectors,
to certain kinds of manufacturing (e.g., carpeting), and to

tourism and amenity based economies. Rural counties that
recent immigrants were drawn to were those with favorable
characteristics in the early 1990’s (e.g., relatively low poverty rates). However, evidence suggests their presence meant
for less improvement in these same characteristics over the
economically prosperous 1990’s than would otherwise have
been the case.
A comparison of recent immigrants in rural areas
suggests that, compared to their more urban counterparts,
they are more likely to be Hispanic (and Mexican-origin in
particular), more likely to be married, less well educated
but still skilled, more likely to be employed but also more
likely to be underemployed, more likely to be poor but less
likely to receive food stamps when they are poor, and more
likely to be homeowners. At the risk of romanticizing, the
image of these new arrivals is of a group of people in rural
areas who are striving to live up to American values of hard
work, marriage, homeownership, and making a contribution.
The impact of immigration can, and often is, more
acutely felt in rural communities than big cities, even if the
absolute numbers of new comers may be much smaller. The
social and economic infrastructures of rural places are often
ill-prepared to handle even comparatively modest increases, and signiﬁcant inﬂows can quickly overwhelm. In small
places, even numerically modest increases can represent a
large increase in population growth.
The unique demographic proﬁle and impact of new immigrants to rural areas need to be a part of the policy discussion. The report suggests that context of reception—the
receptivity of rural and small towns to new immigrants—can
vary greatly from place to place and can have signiﬁcant
impacts on the ability of communities to cope and immigrants
to assimilate and prosper. Communities need resources, and
need to be rewarded for being proactive in being as accommodating as possible. Local, state and federal policies and
programs also need to be better informed by solid research
on the causes, nature and consequences (both positive and
negative, short- and long-term) of immigration to rural areas.
Immigration scholars have been heeding that call, but they
need greater support in doing so.
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Introduction

A New Immigration Wave, the Same Old
Questions

The Eﬀects of Immigration Today Are More
Noticeable in Rural Locales

America is nothing if not a nation of immigrants. Since the
1800s our history has been marked by great waves of immigration from abroad that have served to populate the heartland, coastal cities, and most everywhere in between. And
with every wave of immigration comes a familiar refrain. At
the turn of the last century, when immigrant streams shifted
from northwestern to southern and eastern Europe, natives
worried openly and loudly about what the newest arrivals
would do to the nation’s social fabric and economy. But the
Italians, Poles, Greeks, and others prospered, assimilated,
and—square by square—added to the growing cultural quilt
that is the United States.
For two generations now, America has been in the midst of
another great wave of immigration, this time from countries
in Asia and Latin America and elsewhere in the developing
world. The response has echoed previous concerns. Will they
learn English and become American? Are they too poor? Will
they be a drain on public coﬀers and social services? Will they
take our jobs? Although the question remains open, evidence
to date suggests a familiar image of immigrants working hard,
contributing, assimilating, but also broadening the cultural
mosaic.
A distinguishing feature of immigration since the late 19th
century has been its decided urban orientation. Throughout
the 1970s and 1980s, immigrants entered and settled in gateway cities such as New York, Miami, Chicago, and Los Angeles. In recent years, however, that appears to be changing. A
ﬂurry of research and popular observation has conﬁrmed that
immigrants are beginning to settle in new destinations and
gateway communities. Although many of these are smaller
metropolitan areas, a great many small towns and rural areas
are seeing an inﬂux of new immigrants.

As in the past, the new immigration to rural areas magniﬁes long-standing concerns for some, while for others it
signals possibilities. Flows to places such as New York City
may hardly be felt. Traditional gateways with long histories
of accommodating cultural diﬀerence have existing ethnic
enclaves and social services that new arrivals can rely on to
build a new life. This is not so in rural areas. Given their small
populations, any sizable immigration ﬂow may be profoundly
felt. Newcomers speaking a diﬀerent language, eating diﬀerent foods, attending diﬀerent churches, and rearing children
diﬀerently can spark fear, hostility, and indignation in rural
populations that have remained stable for generations. Even
modest immigration can quickly exhaust housing stocks, tax
local school systems, and stress social services.
Immigrants also oﬀer many potential beneﬁts to fading
rural communities. New arrivals bring vitality, determination, and diligence that can breathe new life into towns
that might otherwise be failing. They work, they consume,
and they volunteer. They bring new ideas, cuisines, music, and cultural practices that can make rural communities
vibrant and exciting. Because immigrants tend to be young
and have relatively high fertility, they can also repopulate
communities that have declining populations. Consider
two communities—described on the following page—both
experiencing a wave of immigration, but both reacting very
diﬀerently to the experience.
These vignettes from typical American towns underscore
how a rapid inﬂux of new immigrants can catch municipalities oﬀ guard; how smallness of place dramatizes and magniﬁes the stresses and costs placed on community infrastructures; how newcomers will be greeted with some resentment
by natives as communities seek to adapt; how immigrants can
demographically and culturally revitalize a place; how local
public school systems often feel the stresses most acutely, yet
also represent a critical forum where old and new cultures
interact; and ﬁnally how the receptiveness and openness of
local leadership can be essential for creating an atmosphere in
which new immigrants can be viewed positively and crafting
local policies that enhance their chances for success. It also
illustrates how undocumented immigration exacerbates an
already diﬃcult situation, and can undermine the receptivity
necessary for the success of legal immigrants.
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The Case of Hazleton, Pennsylvania

A

n Associated Press article by
Janice Podsada (Centre Daily
Times, 10/30/05) describes the inﬂux
of Hispanic immigrants to Hazleton,
Pennsylvania, a coal-mining town whose
population surged from 21,000 to 27,000
due to the arrival in just four years of
“6,000 Hispanic immigrants.” Passages
from this article capture some of the essential elements of new immigrant settlements in rural and small town America.
“No one saw it coming,” Podsada writes
of the inﬂux of new immigrants, and “efforts to accommodate them have angered some residents.” Speciﬁcally, “[t]he
school system’s eﬀorts to educate the new
immigrants have angered some parents
who think the district is catering to Hispanic students at the expense of others.
‘They redo everything for them’ [says
one parent]. As she discusses her complaints, [she] notes that [one of her son’s]
buddies is Hispanic.” Podsada goes on,
“Hazleton’s bulging school system may be
its brightest hope, a place where kids—the
town’s future—meet, mingle and become
friends.” This more positive perspective
is seen strongly in the observations of
the mayor of Hazleton. “The mayor says
the arrival of the immigrants…gives the
area a chance for a new beginning. ‘This

was a town with an aging population and
a bleak outlook,’ [Mayor] Barletta says.
With the inﬂux of Hispanic immigrants,
the pace of life has picked up, new businesses are opening and property values
have increased. The grandson of a miner,
Barletta says people are quick to forget
this town was settled by immigrants.
‘Ninety-nine percent of them want the
same thing my grandfather wanted when
he left Italy—a better life for their kids.’”
Yet only a half-year later Hazleton was
back in the immigration headlines. Reacting to documented instances of violent crime and other problems linked to
the inﬂux of undocumented immigrants,
in July 2006 this small Pennsylvania city
enacted the “Illegal Immigration Relief
Act Ordinance.” The ordinance declares
that “illegal immigration leads to higher
crime rates, contributes to overcrowded
classrooms and failing schools, subjects
our hospitals to ﬁscal hardship and legal residents to substandard quality of
care, contributes to other burdens on
public services, increasing their cost and
diminishing their availability to lawful
residents, and destroys our neighborhoods and diminishes our overall quality of life.” It revokes or denies business
permits to businesses found to employ

undocumented workers, ﬁnes landlords
“not less than $1,000” for renting to
illegal immigrants, and makes English
the oﬃcial language of the city (all forms,
signage, etc., will be in English only). In
an open letter regarding the ordinance,
Mayor Barletta writes, “This ordinance
does not roll back the welcome mat to
those who are legally in the United States.
This country was built on the backs of
legal immigrants. My own great grandparents came to this country seeking a
better life. Rather, this ordinance seeks to
stem the ﬂow of illegal immigrants into
Hazleton. They are not welcome here!”
The ordinance sparked an immediate
national reaction because of its boldness
and severity, and because it underscored
the frustration of one small locality that
perceived inadequacies in federal immigration law. It generated an immediate
reaction from immigrant and Hispanic
rights groups concerned about, among
other things, the chilling and discriminatory fallout on legal immigrants. It
also drew the attention of Pennsylvania
Governor Ed Rendell, who characterized
the ordinance as “mean-spirited” (AP
7/22/2006).

The Case of Marshalltown, Iowa

I

n the small town of Marshalltown, the
Hispanic population grew from 248
to 3,265 during the 1990s (Grey and
Woodrick 2005). As described by Grey
and Woodrick, before Swift and Company constructed the world’s third largest
pork processing plant in Marshalltown,
the town was aging rapidly, as young
people left. The largely Mexican-origin
workers at the plant and their families rejuvenated the population. They moved to
Marshalltown because it oﬀered employment, high-quality schools, a safe environment, and a comparatively low cost
of living. As the Latino population grew,
small ethnic businesses including restaurants, ethnic groceries, bakeries, and
clothing retailers emerged. Other Hispanic entrepreneurial pursuits including
rooﬁng and auto repair catered to both
Latino and non-Latino clientele. As a re-

sult, Marshalltown has become a transnational community that “looks more and
more like Mexico” (Grey and Woodrick
2005, p. 138).
As in Hazleton, natives diﬀer in their
opinions and reactions to it. Grey and
Woodrick suggest a “20-60-20 rule”:
roughly 20 percent of natives are receptive, supportive, and welcoming of newcomers; another 20 percent are antagonistic; and the majority are ambivalent. In
Marshalltown, negative sentiment focuses
on concerns over lack of English, illegal
immigrants, and drugs and crime. The
outcry among some in Marshalltown and
places like it have been so acute that other
communities where would-be meatpacking plants seek to locate have sought to
prevent this from happening.
After an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) raid on a plant that

resulted in the deportation of many
workers, local leaders were faced with
healing the inevitable tensions and divisions that had resulted. Grey and Woodrick encouraged local leaders to visit
the Mexican village of Villachuato, where
the majority of the new immigrants had
roots. The village’s “poverty, lack of power, and lack of opportunities left deep
impressions on the Marshalltown leaders,” Grey and Woodrick write (2005, p.
149). The period of adjustment has not
been easy, and inherent class diﬀerences
remain—including between local Anglo
leaders and the Latino community—that
must be addressed constructively. However, they conclude, “The long-term
prospects for Marshalltown are positive
because there is a strong commitment to
making it work among Anglo community
leaders” (p. 152).
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A Brief History of U.S. Immigration

Colonial period to 1820: Immigrants through the early

1820s were dominated by English and northern and western
Europeans (Bouvier and Gardner 1986). Even then, natives
raised cultural and economic concerns about immigrants.
Some of the earliest settlers reacted negatively toward the
arrival of other non-English groups, especially the Irish and
Germans, who were sometimes greeted with derision, distrust, and outright discrimination (Jones 1960). Economic
worries focused on the poverty and pauperism among immigrants. Indeed, new arrivals during this period were often
quite destitute. Some arrived in indentured servitude, while
others came from European countries purging their relief
rolls by encouraging emigration (Jones 1960; Stephenson
1926). Also contributing to the anti-immigrant sentiment
was the tendency for immigrants to settle in ethnic enclaves.
Similar concerns about poverty and immigrant enclaves are
evident today in both rural and urban America. The colonies
responded to immigration by levying “head taxes” on ship
captains for immigrants deemed likely to become paupers,
or holding ship captains or domestic sponsors liable should
an immigrant become a “public charge” (Hansen 1940). Although immigration during this earliest period was modest,
distrust of newcomers was common, immigrants were often
poor and they tended to concentrate in ethnic enclaves in
both urban areas and the countryside.

1820–1900: The ﬁrst great wave. The ﬁrst great wave of

immigration to the United States began around 1820, with
roughly 143,000 immigrants arriving in the 1820s. Just 30
years later, 2.6 million immigrants arrived during the 1850s
(Jensen 1989). Given that the total U.S. population in 1850
was only 23 million, this was a sizable inﬂux in relative terms.
Immigration stemmed largely from labor displacement in
Europe owing to advances in technology; rapid population
growth in Europe; advances in trans-Atlantic travel; labor recruitment by U.S. employers; and from stories of a better life
in the United States (Davis 1974; Mayo-Smith 1980; Portes
and Bach 1985; Stephenson 1926; Vialet 2002).
As Vialet (2002, pp. 13, 14) reports, immigration during
this time “was the result of a near perfect match between the
needs of a new country and overcrowded Europe….America…had a boundless need for people to push back the fron-

tier, to build the railways, to defend unstable boundaries, and
to populate new States.” Policy reﬂected this need, and was
largely pro-immigration. The Homestead Act of 1862 made
agricultural lands in the Midwest, the Plains, and beyond
available to immigrants as well as the native born. The settlement of Norwegians, Swedes, and other northern Europeans
in these regions is still evident in the cultural traditions of
the regions today. Ironically, some of these same communities now face population and economic decline that might be
stemmed by a new stream of immigration.

1860–1930: The second wave. The second great wave of im-

migration to the United States, which overlapped with the
ﬁrst, shifted away from northwestern European countries to
southern and eastern Europe, as economic and demographic
dynamics that caused emigration from northwestern Europe
spread south and east (Jones 1960). In appearance, religion,
and in other ways, second-wave immigrants stood out, making assimilation more diﬃcult. These immigrants arrived in
an America that was far more urban and industrial than that
encountered by the ﬁrst wave of immigrants. The second wave
hailed from poorer countries, frequently arrived with very
little, settled in destitute urban neighborhoods, and strained
the resources of cities ill-equipped to handle them. All of this
fueled concerns that the United States was admitting far too
many poor immigrants.
Despite evidence that these immigrants were proving economically successful (Lieberson 1980), perceptions of negative social and economic consequences were strong. The result was an era of restrictive immigration laws. The Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882 quickly halted the inﬂux of Chinese labor. In 1891 Congress sought to restrict the entry of “classes”
of immigrants, notably paupers and those deemed likely to
become public charges. The Immigration Act of 1917 institutionalized literacy as a criterion of entry, doubled the head tax
on new arrivals, and extended the exclusion of Chinese immigrants to other Asian nations (Jones 1960). The Immigration
and Nationality Acts of 1921 and 1924 fundamentally altered
immigration by implementing the National Origin Quota
System, which strictly limited immigration and set countryof-origin quotas greatly favoring northwestern Europe.
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1930–1965: An era of limited immigration. The National

Origin Quota System dramatically diminished the ﬂow of
immigrants, and the Great Depression further reduced the
motivation and ability to leave Europe. Labor demand during
Word War II eased some of the restrictions. For example, the
Bracero Program actively recruited Mexican labor into U.S.
agriculture (Samora et al. 1971). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 gave priority to would-be immigrants
with skills needed in the labor market and, secondarily, to
those seeking to be reunited with kin. The 1952 act passed
over President Truman’s veto, who objected to its retention of
the discriminatory quota system.

1965 to today: The third wave. The third great wave of im-

migration began in 1965 and continues to this day. In an era
in which civil rights and equality were increasingly valued,
1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act
dismantled the National Origin Quota System and replaced
it with a far more equitable worldwide distribution of visas.
The legislation also shuﬄed the preference categories, giving
priority to family reuniﬁcation as a criterion for entry. As a
result, immigration accelerated and migration ﬂows shifted
toward Asian and Latin American nations. Parallels to the
second wave are noteworthy including the shift toward less
developed and poorer countries of origin and immigrant
groups who were diﬀerent in culture, language, and appearance. Both waves also stirred popular and political concern
about presumed negative social and economic impacts.
Today, two economic questions are paramount, yet deﬁnitive answers are elusive. First, do new immigrants displace native workers and depress wages? Martin and Midgley (2003)
suggest that displacement and wage eﬀects are quite modest,
but they may be sizable in particular industries (notably meatpacking and agriculture). Second, do new immigrants pay
their own way and contribute more in taxes than they take in
services? Here it is important to recognize that ﬁscal impacts
tend to be place speciﬁc, with states and localities often bearing the cost of education and services. In contrast, beneﬁts
such as immigrant tax contributions are disproportionately
federal. Immigrants with higher education and thus higher
earnings are likely to produce an immediate net beneﬁt. Finally the long-term ﬁscal impact of immigrants remains to be

seen because it will depend on the economic fortunes of their
children (Martin and Midgley 2003).

A postscript on immigration reform: Immigration

policy again tops the legislative agenda. During the 1980s,
worries about the ﬂood of immigration, particularly those
entering or staying in the country illegally, brought loud calls
for action from organized labor and the NAACP (LeMay
2004). A protracted and contentious debate gave rise to the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). The
principal features of IRCA were employer sanctions and an
amnesty program that legalized 2.7 million undocumented
immigrants (Martin and Midgley 2003). For rural America,
a key component was the Special Agricultural Worker program (SAW), which legalized those who had worked in agricultural for 90 days or more. Kandel and Cromartie (2004)
note that an unintended (but not surprising) consequence of
the SAWs program was that these agricultural workers, now
legalized, were free to move to other regions and sectors of
the economy. As they did so, they left behind unmet demand
for agricultural labor, which created a magnet for additional
undocumented immigrants. This had implications both for
the rural communities they were leaving and those in which
they were settling.
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Background and Evidence
Immigrants are Moving Beyond Traditional Gateway Cities
Hazleton and Marshalltown are but two examples. But just
how real and widespread is this phenomenon? Where exactly
are new immigrants to rural areas moving, and what are these
places like?
A common image is that immigration to the United States
has been an almost exclusively urban phenomenon. Teeming immigrant neighborhoods in Boston, New York, or San
Francisco come to mind. However, as alluded to in the brief
history of U.S. immigration, many early immigrants bypassed
cities altogether and settled in rural locales, often to eke out
a living in agriculture and extractive industries. However,
by the mid-1800s, the prime destination for new immigrant
groups was the large gateway cities. Even today, more than
one-half of the foreign-born live in the 13 traditional gateway
cities identiﬁed by Logan (2003), including New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.
However, new evidence suggests immigrant groups may
be bypassing traditional gateways altogether. Demographer
Audrey Singer (2004) of the Brookings Institution describes
emerging gateway metropolitan areas (such as Atlanta, Dallas, and Washington, DC), and other metro areas that appear
destined to be new gateways (such as Austin, Texas and Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina). There is also evidence that
immigrant groups are also settling in small town and rural
America.
Daniel T. Lichter and Kenneth M. Johnson (2006) studied the movement of recent arrivals to emerging rural settlements between 1990 and 2000. They ﬁnd that 297 counties,
or nearly 10 percent of all counties, had foreign-born populations that totaled 5 percent or more of the population for the
ﬁrst time in 2000. Many of these counties are at the peripheries of traditional settlement areas with already high concentrations of foreign-born individuals. However, they ﬁnd the
same scattering of new immigrant destinations elsewhere in
rural America noted by others (Kandel and Cromartie 2004):
pockets in the Midwest, Southeast, and elsewhere. Indeed, it
was increases in the foreign-born population that prevented or stemmed population losses during the 1990s in many
heartland counties. As a result of these population shifts, Lichter and Johnson document a decline at the county level in
spatial segregation of the native-born and the recently arrived
foreign-born during the 1990s, a decline registered in both
urban and rural areas and in most regions of the country.

Majority of Immigrants Residing in Rural Areas Are
Hispanic
A disproportionate share of all immigrants residing in rural
America is Hispanic. For this reason, it is worth exploring recent rural settlement patterns of Hispanics, regardless of their
immigrant status.1 As William Kandel and John Cromartie
(2004) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture show, the overwhelming majority of Hispanics were urban in 1990 (95 percent). However, during the 1990s, Hispanics accounted for
more than one-quarter of the total population growth in rural areas. Hispanics moved to rural areas in all parts of the
country, but particularly to the Southeast and Midwest. They
were attracted by, if not outright recruited for, opportunities
in agriculture, meat packing and other food processing, timber harvesting and processing, and other industries.
Hispanic Immigrants Are Dispersing More, But Are Still
Segregating in Ethnic Enclaves Once They Arrive
A clear sign of assimilation is the level of residential and community integration. Therefore, it is worth asking, if Hispanics
are moving in substantial numbers to new rural settlements
away from the traditional gateway communities in the Southwest, are they integrating with the non-Hispanic white population? Kandel and Cromartie (2004) found that, at the county
level, Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites were intermingling
more. However, when looking at communities or neighborhoods within counties, residential segregation increased during the 1990s. Thus, Hispanics are moving to new counties in
rural America, but once there, they are still living in ethnic
enclaves within a town or community.

1

In much of the research reviewed and presented in this report, the term
“rural” refers to nonmetropolitan counties, and rural residents are the people residing in such counties. Terms are deﬁned in the data and methods
section.
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Nopalitos in the Catskills—Immigration in Sullivan County, NY
By Julie Ardery

B

etween late May and early September
each year, the population of Sullivan County, NY (est. 76,000) triples. The
streets of sleepy Woodbourne—once the
famed Borscht Belt— bustle with Hasidic
visitors in long whiskers and black hats.
Bungalow colonies ﬁll up with families,
and harness track fans pack the “racino”
outside the county seat.
Though its glory days as the summer
stopover for Milton Berle and Buddy
Hackett have passed, the summer tourists
still come. Immigration in this seasonal
sense is nothing new to Sullivan County.
Since 1990, however, other sorts of
immigrants have arrived—New Yorkers
ﬂeeing the city post 9/11, second-home
buyers from the eastern seaboard, a
Ukrainian community that settled in the
southern township of Lumberland, and,
signiﬁcantly, a new wave of Latino residents who have moved here into cheap
housing and low-wage jobs.
Though its inﬂux of Hispanic newcomers doesn’t match big increases in the
South and West, Sullivan County between
1990 and 2000 saw the third highest gain
in new immigrants (those coming to the
U.S. after 1965) of all nonmetro counties
in the Northeast (after Nantucket and
Dukes counties, Massachusetts).
“We’re on a rebound,” says Marc Baez
of the county’s Partnership for Economic
Development. Baez, whose Puerto Rican
parents moved here in the heyday of the
old resorts. Baez says that when Sullivan’s
tourist industry collapsed, starting in the
1970s and declining steeply over the next
ten years, “We fell on really hard times.”
“We didn’t have an underlying industry poised to expand,” explains Laura
Quigley, director of Sullivan’s Workforce
Development Board. Local leaders adopted a fairly desperate strategy, “Then,
anything that walked through the door
we’d take,” says Baez.
The western half of Sullivan County
had long been dairy country, but local
dairymen have been phasing out for the
past 20 years. Meanwhile, poultry indus-

tries multiplied and expanded. “There are
26 million New Yorkers only 50 minutes
away,” Baez notes. “What do they want
and how can we serve them?”
In this regard, one of Sullivan’s more
exceptional businesses is Hudson Valley Foie Gras. Here some 170 workers,
nearly all recent immigrants, force feed
ducks on a strict schedule throughout the
day and night, producing the ingredient
for pâté, a delicacy priced at over $50 a
pound. Sullivan County is home to more
conventional chicken plants, egg processing factories, and over two dozen small
poultry farms. “The types of people who
are willing to work in those environments
are very few,” Baez says. All these enterprises rely on immigrant labor.
Soﬁa Romero, 32, moved to Sullivan
County in 2001 from San Pedro Sula,
Honduras. Her long trip north involved,
among other risks, three days walking
through the Arizona desert. In Honduras, she had worked since age 14 at a garment factory, raised by her grandparents;
her mother had come to the United States
when Soﬁa was only 12. When Romero
emigrated to the U.S., she left behind her
own son, now age 12, in her grandmother’s care.
In Honduras she had earned 340
lempira—less than $19—per 40-hour
week. Romero says she came to the U.S.
for higher wages, and because in Honduras “when you’re 30, there’s no more
work.” Factory owners typically shuﬄe
older women out of the plant and hire
teenagers to replace them.
After two years at an egg processing
plant in Woodridge, Romero was earning $5.75 an hour, working 6 a.m. to 5
p.m. Her job peeling eggs under a constant stream of cold water and washing
machinery with a high-pressure hose and
caustic detergents caused psoriasis on her
hands, a condition that worsened after
Romero became pregnant. She quit, and
says she will soon start work at a chicken
processing plant.

At a small gathering of friends in Hurleyville, Romero expresses shock; she’s
just heard about a new on-line video
game called “Border Control,” where
the object is to kill immigrants coming
over the Mexican border. “You get more
points if you shoot a pregnant woman,”
she informs the group. Her life in Sullivan County has been hard but by staying
she sees “an opportunity to make money
to send home to my son and my grandmother.”
Carlos Mendoza, 34, moved from El
Salvador to Sullivan County with his wife
in May 2004. They left their two sons
behind with his mother. Mendoza had a
sister in Sullivan County and relatives in
Texas also. He says he chose rural New
York over Houston thinking that there
would be “not so many people” and that
ﬁnding employment would be easier
here. His ﬁrst job was cutting sacks at the
Formaggio cheese plant, six days a week.
He then worked at one of the egg companies, and most recently at a factory in
Liberty packaging “galletas” -- snacks. On
an evening in April, Mendoza was fuming having just been ﬁred from the snack
company for a dispute over his hours. He
contended that he’d been shortchanged
for 3.5 hours of work and was told by a
manager “the computer doesn’t lie.” When
he continued to press for the lost wages,
he was dismissed. Mendoza’s wife works
second shift at the snack factory, but he’ll
be looking for something else—not easy,
since the couple lives in Liberty, has no
car, and, as in many rural counties, there’s
no public transportation.
Among most long-time residents in
Sullivan County, this new wave of immigrants remains fairly invisible. “They
work in restaurants and garages, and generally keep to themselves in this area. You
know, they have their niche,” said a staﬀ
person at the Chamber of Commerce.
Both the foie gras farm and Formaggio
cheese house many of their employees,
an arrangement that eases getting to
work but further isolates an immigrant
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community already set apart by language.
Undocumented workers, who may ﬁrst
welcome such invisibility, have found
themselves, like Carlos Mendoza, at the
mercy of employers.
Ninon Hutchinson, minister of St.
John’s Episcopal Church in Monticello,
has tried various ways to involve her
largely non-Latino parish with the new
community, from serving coﬀee and
doughnuts outside the duck farm to winterizing the shabby apartments near one
of the chicken factories. When an immigrant family was “run out of housing
over a labor protest,” Hutchinson said,
the family moved temporarily into the
church itself. With two other clergy from
nearby towns, Hutchinson oﬃciated at a
service to bless the opening of Monticello’s new Latino Deli. St. John’s holds periodic fundraisers for organizations serving the immigrant community. Still, she
concedes, “It’s a very diﬃcult connection
to make.”
Gradually, new institutions have
emerged to make the presence, contributions, and needs of Latino residents
known. In 1992, Aspacio Alcántara,
himself a Dominican, helped to organize
the Centro Independiente de Apoyo a
los Trabajadores Agrícolas (CITA). The
group, ﬁrst based in neighboring Orange County, worked to get basics like
bathrooms and clean drinking water for
farm workers in the Hudson Valley. The
organization’s legal arm brokered one of
its ﬁrst agreements with a Sullivan County poultry ﬁrm, a company that had been
unfairly withholding workers’ wages for
rent and uniforms.
Attorney Dan Werner worked with
CITA on that early case though the Farmworkers Law Center. He and his partners
recognized that the area was changing,
“shifting from agriculture to a suburban
economy” more focused on construction,
landscaping and light industry. The Hudson Valley’s farm workers have been, “almost exclusively Mexicans,” most of them
from the impoverished Southern state of
Puebla, but “in these other industries it’s
much more of a mixed bag,” says Werner. The recent immigrants who work
in Sullivan’s poultry and food processing plants come from across Central and

South America, notably Peru, Ecuador, El
Salvador, and Honduras.
Werner now directs the Workers Law
Center of New York. Founded in 2004,
based in Kingston, it serves nine Hudson
Valley counties. The Center has been involved in more than 300 labor disputes,
several in Sullivan County. All its Sullivan clients have been immigrant workers. (Federal law protects workers’ rights
regardless of their immigration status.)
Because immigrants often move from
job to job, like Carlos Mendoza, and fear
arrest and deportation if they confront
an employer, violations of labor law often
go unchallenged. And without long-term
advocates, like CITA and the Workers
Law Center, such challenges tend to sputter out. Employers can outspend or just
outlast immigrant plaintiﬀs. Aspacio Alcántara believes that CITA’s decade-plus
of work, backed up in court, has “changed
the relationship” between farm workers
and employers. “They cannot ﬁre people
so easily.” He also ﬁnds, “There’s a little
more respect… There’s not one legislator in New York State who doesn’t know
about the farm worker now.” Likewise,
with a recent ruling against Formaggio,
Dan Werner says, “I think that a lot of
people who might have been afraid to
step forward will recognize this is real.”
Sandra Cuellar Oxford is a community activist who’s been involved most recently in the living-wage issue, opposing
tax-abatements and other governmental
supports for companies that pay lowwages. In Sullivan County, Bella Poultry,
Hudson Valley Foie Gras and Formaggio
Cheese all have received funding and/or
tax breaks through the local Industrial

Development Agency and state Empire
Zone program. These ﬁnancial incentives
are “the engines,” Oxford says, “helping
these employers who’ve been abusing
workers.”
A native of Colombia, Oxford moved
to Hurleyville from Long Island looking
for aﬀordable housing. When she ﬁrst
moved to Sullivan County 14 years ago
“not one Latino student had graduated
from (Fallsburg) high school.” She and
others founded Somos la Llave del Futuro
(We’re the Key to the Future) in 2002 to
rally local Hispanics and work on their
behalf.
The group ﬁrst mobilized around
health, a serious problem for immigrants
here. Sullivan County has New York
State’s highest rate of HIV/AIDS outside
New York City, and though by the 2000
U.S. Census, Hispanics composed only
9.24 percent of the county’s population,
in 2004 25 percent of the HIV patients in
care at Catskill Regional Medical Center
were Latinos. In 2004, Sullivan’s infant
mortality rate was the highest in New
York State.
Carol Ryan, the county’s public health
director, says that many new immigrants
are in bad health. She recounts a wide
range of health concerns, from poor
diet to rape: “No health insurance. No
sick pay. Not enough sleep. Respiratory
complaints. No prenatal care. Domestic violence. Alcoholism…these are the
problems of any impoverished group.” Yet
among immigrants “there’s also despair,”
she says, “and a lot of stress on them, being away from their families.”
Ryan emphasizes that just making
programs like WIC, prenatal care and
immunizations available isn’t suﬃcient
when dealing with these new communities. Immigrants resist seeking medical
care when doctors speak only English,
and they are typically reluctant to enroll
in basic health programs, fearing discovery and deportation. To reach immigrant
clients, Ryan says her oﬃce has adopted
“more of a service orientation.” Two years
ago, Sullivan County’s public health oﬃce
hired its ﬁrst bilingual outreach worker,
Zaida Chasi. A native of Ecuador, Chasi
had already worked as a translator in
the local courts and in Sullivan County’s
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Headstart program. “That’s when I started working with the community, with
families in crisis,” she says. After three
years with Headstart, “people started to
know me, I was out in the community,
doing outreach, getting the children into
the program.” She noticed a change, “The
more I was an advocate for families, the
more children who were enrolled in the
programs.”
Ryan agrees. “It takes a trusted person.
That trust brings them into care.” Her
department records show no immigrant
families participating in the WIC program until 2004, the year Chasi was hired.
Since then, WIC enrollment among immigrants has gradually increased, from
10 families in January 2004 to 41 in
March 2006.
A promising new organization in Sullivan County is Hudson River Community Health. This 30-year-old nonproﬁt,
with 14 branches throughout the region,
oﬀers primary, preventive and behavioral
health services without regard for ability
to pay. The Monticello oﬃce has hired
both Chasi and Aspacio Alcántara as outreach workers. In neighboring counties,
the organization, as well as administering
health care services, has been a conduit
for language training, social services,
and community empowerment though
its “Comités Latinos.” Sandra Oxford believes the organization will take the same
strong role in Sullivan County. “Once
that health center really takes root, it can
be a cornerstone for the emerging community,” she stresses. “There’s a path of
support.”
Since September 2003, a Latino Service Providers group—involving Sullivan
County health care, school, and social
service oﬃces—has met monthly to discuss changing needs and strategies for
cooperation. But beyond this group of
professionals, citizen organizing within
the Latino community has been erratic.
What’s often inscrutable to longtime
residents here, Hispanic immigrants are
a diverse group. Zaida Chasi says, “Even
though we’re Latino, we don’t speak the
same language, in a sense. We have different dialects. We have diﬀerent culture,
and there is not that unity. There needs
to be.” Chasi, Oxford, and others say that

discrimination based on education is especially keen among Hispanics and has
made unifying the immigrant community hard.
In the public schools, such divisions
sharpen. Fallsburg High School’s bilingual social worker Paco Mazo, after 16
years, can count the Latino graduates on
one hand. All of them had come to the
U.S. as young children, from educated or
aﬄuent families. “The younger the child,
the easier it is to assimilate,” Mazo says.
“The older they are, the more barriers.”
He has yet to see an immigrant student
who arrived in Sullivan County as a teenager—and there have been many—earn a
Fallsburg diploma.
When young people arrive in Sullivan County as teenagers to rejoin their
birthparents, after sometimes a decade or
more apart, they bring high expectations:
“There’s a honeymoon for awhile but it’s
a short honeymoon,” Mazo says. “They
give up their peer group, they don’t know
the language.” A teenager ﬁnds that he or
she has traded a big extended family back
home for life in a Catskills housing project, the newcomer among relatives they
barely know.
Most Latino teens, Mazo says, look
around and soon ask themselves, “What
am I doing here in school when I could
be working in the chicken plant and
buy myself a gold chain?’ They’re playing football,” says Mazo, “staying among
their Spanish speaking friends, listening
to novellas. They’re here in America but
they’re immersed in a Hispanic subculture, and that’s where they stay.”
He and Chasi both are trying to bring
to light a widespread problem in the La-

tino community here. Teenage girls, who
are struggling both a home and at school,
are easy prey for older men. “The young
girls who are being seduced and getting
pregnant so young, they’re not ﬁnishing
school,” Chasi, says. “It’s like an epidemic.” Mazo agrees. “A girl has a one night
stand and is thrown out by her parents,
living with an older man. When the baby
comes, he’s out the door.” Sullivan’s teenage pregnancy rate is by far the highest in
the Hudson Valley.
Historically, Sullivan County society
has been more patched than woven. Planning Commissioner Bill Pammer, who
grew up on a farm here, says that diverse
populations have tended to self-segregate.
Segregation can be a state of mind as well.
The many commuters and second-home
owners buying and building in Sullivan
County tend to view the area, Marc Baez
says, as “a playground,” missing its very
real, “urban”-seeming problems: poverty,
lack of public transportation, AIDS, slum
housing, traﬃc.
“When you have (groups) that isolate,
they want to land in your community but
not live in your community,” says Laura
Quigley, the workforce development director. Quigley’s description ﬁts both of
Sullivan County’s new immigrant groups:
the Hispanic newcomers here to work
and wire money oﬀ to relatives in other
countries, and the city émigrés who have
come looking for a rural idyll. Over time,
these social disjunctions “can impact
your image of yourself as a community,”
she says; a county or a town devolves into
“just a fractured group of people on the
same plot of land.”
Groups like the Workers Rights Center
and Hudson River Community Health,
and activists like Oxford, Alcántara,
Hutchinson, Mazo and Chasi have made
inroads. Their endurance may be the
most signiﬁcant victory. “This town has
changed their attitude,” Zaida Chasi says
about Monticello. “Before it was like they
would close the door on you. They’re a
little bit more receptive to see the (Hispanic) community walking in the streets
or seeing the stores open. Now there’s
more awareness that we’re here, and we’re
not leaving.”
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Immigration’s Role in Rural Poverty
The arrival of immigrant groups in rural and small-town
America is a new phenomenon in some parts of the country,
but has been going on for some time in other areas. At the
forefront of research on immigration to rural areas has been
that of Philip Martin, J. Edward Taylor, and colleagues at the
University of California-Davis. Their Changing Face project
seeks to “assess the prospects for migrants and their children
arriving in Rural America.” A key issue is whether there is a
circular relationship, a “vicious circle” in their terms, between
three key characteristics of rural communities: farm employment, immigration, and poverty (Martin, Fix, and Taylor
2006). The process commences with solo male workers acting
as pioneers taking seasonal farm jobs, sending home much of
their income and otherwise costing localities little and being
statistically invisible. Some workers successfully exit seasonal
work to take more full-time work in agricultural and other
industries, creating unmet demand for seasonal agricultural
labor and thus additional immigration. Families of solo males
join them, and their presence, particularly that of their children, begins to be felt as poverty and demand for services increases. Finally, new immigrants become more integrated and
politically active, calling for action to address the chronic and
deep poverty they face (Taylor, Martin, and Fix 1997; Martin
and Taylor 2003).
Analyzing 1970, 1980, and 1990 data from a random
sample of rural and urban census tracts, Martin and
Taylor (2003) conﬁrm a circular relationship between farm
employment and immigration, with one reinforcing the
other. Interestingly, they ﬁnd that in 1980 farm employment
reduced poverty, but by 1990 the relationship had reversed.
In that year “a 100-person increase in farm employment was
associated with an 85-person increase in poverty” (Martin,
Fix, and Taylor 2006, p. 24). This and other studies suggest
an interconnection between farm employment, immigration,
and poverty. While the areas likely to be signiﬁcantly impacted by this dynamic are rural, it is imperative that discussions
of immigration to rural and small-town America reach beyond farm employment and agriculture, which even in rural
America do not employ a majority of immigrant workers.
This research calls attention to the implications of immigration for poverty rates within rural places. A related and important question is the extent to which the dispersal of immigrants to new locales has improved their own circumstances.
Martha Crowley, Daniel T. Lichter and Zhenchao Qian (2006)
show that the dispersal over the 1990’s of Mexican workers,
immigrants in particular, away from the Southwest served to
signiﬁcantly reduce their poverty rates.
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Region by Region:
Where Immigrants Are Moving and Why
This section locates and describes rural places that have had
signiﬁcant inﬂows of recent immigrants. As a point of departure, however, it is important to indicate where recent immigrants are, and where they are not. Map 1 shows the absolute
size of the recent immigrant population in counties as of 2000,
with darker shades of red indicating places with the greatest
numbers. Recent immigrants continue to live in traditional
destinations, such as the Boston to Washington corridor,
south Florida, the metropolitan areas and border region of
Texas, Chicago, and urban California.
Map 2 shows the relative change in the recent immigrant
population between 1990 and 2000 in the 75 percent of U.S.
counties that are nonmetropolitan. Darker shades of red indicate places that have had large recent immigrant inﬂows relative to their 1990 population size.2 The map illustrates that
immigration has had at least a moderate impact on each rural
area of the country. Given the economic, demographic, and
social diversity of the country, it is not surprising that immigration patterns diﬀer as well.
2

This somewhat novel measure of change seeks to identify those places
where the inﬂows of recent immigrants would be more acutely felt. This
county-level measure is calculated as the post-1965 foreign-born population
in 2000 minus that in 1990, divided by the county’s total 1990 population.
See data and methods section.

The Rural Northeast Has Seen Relatively Little
Change
Although no rural county in the Northeast has experienced
extremely high immigration (as measured here), modest
gains are evident in northern Vermont and New Hampshire,
in the region between New York City and Albany, and in eastern Pennsylvania. In Monroe County, Pennsylvania, for example, the recent immigrant population more than doubled,
from 2,259 to 5,805. Monroe County is sometimes referred
to by locals as the sixth borough of Manhattan as more and
more residents are commuting the 80 miles or so to New York
City. Although there are certainly rural counties and communities in the Northeast that have been destinations for recent
immigrants, the majority of the action is elsewhere.

Immigrants to the Southeast Are Drawn to
Manufacturing, Food Processing, and Agriculture
The Southeast has several pockets of substantial immigration.
Often the economic base of these places relies on natural resources (agriculture, lumber) and their processing or manufacture (e.g., poultry processing, furniture manufacturing). A
belt of rural counties with high immigrant inﬂux runs east to
west across North Carolina (Map 2). The impact of this im-

Map 1: Total Post-1965 Foreign-born Population in 2000: All counties in the U.S.
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Map 2: New Immigration Population Change: Non-metro Counties in the U.S.

migration is reﬂected in the website of Duplin County, NC,
which oﬀers a Spanish version and boasts a rural charm and
agricultural heritage but with “urban access.” Its recent immigrant population increased nearly tenfold over the 1990s
(from roughly 500 to 5,000), and only 11 percent of its current
foreign-born population are citizens. Other counties in this
belt include Sampson, Lee, and Montgomery. The Hispanic
population in these counties (between 10 and 15 percent) is
roughly half the size of the African American population. The
counties’ industrial structure is dominated by manufacturing
and food processing (including poultry, pork, vegetable), as
well as lumber processing and furniture manufacturing. One
local oﬃcial from Montgomery County excitedly mentioned
that an Elite Food turkey processing facility was coming soon
to complement their furniture manufacturing.
Lumber, molding, and other wood products are also common farther south in Atkinson County, Georgia (pop. 6,000),
where 17 percent of the population is Hispanic. Its recent immigrant population grew from a negligible 93 to 895 during
the 1990s. Gilmer County, which describes itself as Georgia’s
“Apple Capital,” features some food processing as does neighboring Gordon County. Manufacturing, carpeting, and other
ﬂoor coverings also contribute signiﬁcantly to the economy.
Although the percentage of the population that is Hispanic
is small (less than 10 percent), the increase is dramatic. For

example, the recent immigrant population of Gilmer County
increased nearly 30-fold, from 46 to 1,286 over the decade. A
cluster of rural counties in southern interior Florida also is
quite apparent in Map 2. Several of these counties are dominated by agriculture. Hendry County, for example, the “Citrus Capital of Florida,” employs 23 percent of its workforce
in agriculture. About 40 percent of Hendry’s population is
Hispanic, with an immigrant population gain from about
3,200 to about 8,100 over the decade. Several other counties
in this cluster have agricultural workforces ranging from 20
to 30 percent. Included are Hardee County, the self-described
“Cucumber Capital of the World,” and DeSoto County, whose
economy is based on citrus, cattle, and softwood processing.
The proximity of these rural counties to Tampa and Miami,
both places of high immigrant concentration, might be contributing to this rapid rise in recent immigrant populations
in the interior.

The Heartland Draws Immigrants with Its
Meatpacking
Vast swaths of the Midwest are rural, and Map 2 indicates
pockets where recent immigrants are ﬂowing in substantial
numbers. Almost without exception, these counties house
sizable meatpacking or other food processing concerns. An

19

example is Cass County, Illinois, home of a large Cargill hog
processing plant employing 2,300 workers, some 35 percent
of whom are Latino according to one local oﬃcial. Although
only 9 percent of Cass County’s population is Hispanic, the
recent immigrant population grew roughly 25 times, from 41
to 1,049, over the 1990s. A pallet plant and a hardwood drying company also provide local employment. A local oﬃcial
pointed out that many of the latest arrivals are undocumented and thus undercounted in oﬃcial statistics, and they also
concentrate in one part of the county near the Cargill plant.
Although this strains the local school and social services, he
said, it was his own personal philosophy that they are human
beings ﬁrst and deserved to be helped, regardless of their legal
status.
In Minnesota, Nobles County has a Swift meatpacking
plant, while Watonwan County has plants run by Conagra
and Tony Downs Foods. Both counties are characterized by
high percentages employed in manufacturing, relatively low
Hispanic populations (11 and 15 percent, respectively), and
ﬁve- or sixfold increases in their recent immigrant populations. In Nebraska, Dawson County’s recent immigrant population grew from 38 to about 3,800 over the 1990s, with a
big draw being an IBP plant (Gouveia and Stull 1995). The
meatpacking industry also helps account for substantial new
immigrant population growth in Finney, Ford, Seward and
other counties in rural southwestern Kansas.

Arkansas, East Texas, and the Rio Grande Draw
Immigrants
An area ﬂowing south from Arkansas and arcing west into
east Texas is drawing immigrants to meat processing and
other opportunities. Yell County, Arkansas, is 13 percent
Hispanic with an economy based on poultry, hog, and beef
processing. Its recent immigrant population grew 12fold over the decade. Sevier County, Arkansas, has a similar
industrial structure, featuring a Pilgrim’s Pride poultry processing plant, helping to explain why 30 percent of workers
are in manufacturing and why its recent immigrant population quadrupled over the decade to nearly 2,000. A Pilgrim’s
Pride plant in Titus County, Texas accounts for the tripling of
the recent immigrant population there.
A string of rural counties along the border of Texas and
Mexico, and stretching into New Mexico and Arizona also
have experienced rapid increases in their recent immigrant
populations. Given their proximity to Mexico and roots as
former territories of Mexico, it is little surprise that they are
overwhelmingly Hispanic. Seven of the eight rural counties
noted on Map 2 have populations that are more than one-half
Hispanic, ﬁve are more than 80 percent Hispanic, and Starr

County, Texas is fully 98 percent Hispanic. The economies
across these border counties are more diverse, and feature
agriculture and other extractive industries (mining) or services.

Tourism-Based Economies Draw Immigrants to
the Mountain West and the West Coast
A distinctive feature of many of the rural counties in the West
that are attracting recent immigrants is their tourism-based
economies that capitalize on natural amenities. Examples
include Summit County and Eagle County, Colorado, home
to the Breckenridge and Vail ski areas. In both cases, the
leading industry of employment is recreation services (i.e.,
arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food
services), followed by construction, which also is related to
the growth of tourism in the area. Although the recent immigrant populations grew substantially in both these counties, the increase was especially striking in Eagle County,
where the immigrant population grew more than ﬁvefold,
from 1,284 to 7,289, or a 27.4 percent increase from the 1990
total population (21,928). Other rural counties with tourism-based economies that received signiﬁcant numbers of
recent immigrants include Teton County, Wyoming (home
of Jackson Hole ski area); Mono County, California along the
Nevada border, which touts its natural beauty, ﬁshing, and
other outdoor recreation; Blaine County, Idaho, another ski
area; and Elk County, Nevada, which promotes its high quality of life and easy urban access.
Other counties in the West attract recent immigrants with
their agricultural employment opportunities. These include
Colusa County, in California’s fertile Central Valley, where the
recent immigrant population increased from approximately
3,000 in 1990 to 5,000 in 2000. Three counties in northern
Oregon (Morrow, Hood River, and Jeﬀerson) have attracted
many recent immigrants. Morrow County had a stagnant or
declining population until the late 1970s but subsequently
grew owing to the advance of its agricultural, food processing,
and lumber industries. Its recent immigrant population tripled during the 1990s. Jeﬀerson County produces vegetables,
grass and ﬂower seeds, garlic, mint, and sugar beets, industries that have attracted immigrant workers. Grant County,
Washington, touts itself as the leading grower of potatoes,
with apples and green peas following close behind. Its population is 30 percent Hispanic, and nearly one in ﬁve workers
are in agriculture. Its recent immigrant population roughly
tripled, from 3,623 to 11,850, expanding its total population
by 15 percent during the 1990, a tremendous increase by any
standard. Neighboring Adams County saw a similar increase;
its population is now 47 percent Hispanic and highly agri-
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Table 1. Average relative change in recent immigrant population for counties by county type*
Recent immigrant
population change

All counties

Metro counties

Nonmetro counties

Micro counties

Non-core counties

Low

.12

.42

.02

.20

-.06

Medium

.89

1.60

.66

.92

.55

High

4.81

6.74

3.60

4.83

2.96

Total

1.94

2.91

1.42

1.97

1.14

* Cell entries are averages of the following indicator: change in the recent (post-1965) immigrant population divided by total county population in 1990 multiplied by 100.
Counties were subdivided into thirds according to this indicator to form low-, medium-, and high-growth categories of recent immigrant population change. See data and
methods section for more detail.
Source: 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census of Population and Housing, summary files.

cultural. Finally, Clark County, Idaho, and a cluster of three
other Idaho counties (Lincoln, Jerome, and Gooding), all
have more workers employed in agriculture than any other
single industry. By and large, however, these Idaho counties
are very sparsely populated, and although their recent immigrant populations taken together quadrupled over the decade,
the absolute numbers are relatively small.

Immigrants Settling in Both Sparsely Populated
Rural Areas and More Populated Nonmetro Areas,
but Urban Locales Predominate
To further illustrate general trends in recent immigration,
Table 1 shows average percentage changes in recent immigrant population (as deﬁned for Map 2) with counties evenly
divided into low-, medium-, and high-growth groups. This
was done for all counties, separately for metropolitan and
nonmetropolitan counties, and among the latter, for micropolitan and noncore counties.3 Table 1 shows that relative
increases in the recent immigrant population were considerably higher in urban counties (around 3 percent) than rural
counties (less than 2 percent), and that within rural places,
they were higher in micropolitan areas (2 percent) than
noncore counties (1 percent). In sum, urban areas remained
the residence of choice among recent immigrants, and to the
extent there was growth in rural areas, it was faster in more
city-like micropolitan areas than the more rural noncore
counties. Even among high-growth counties, the increase in

3

Micropolitan counties are nonmetropolitan, but contain a town or city of
at least 10,000 population, or are tied economically to a micropolitan county
through commuting patterns. Noncore counties are not metropolitan and
have no such urban settlement, and are not economically tied to a micropolitan county. See data and methods section for more detail.

the recent immigrant population is relatively modest. Among
all high-growth rural counties, the average increase was only
3.6 percent. This relatively low average, however, masks rather
high growth in a small number of counties.
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A Closer Look:
High-Growth, Low-Growth Rural Counties
Rural Counties with Highest Immigration Growth
Employed More in Construction and Services, and
County Residents Were More Economically Stable
Table 2 shows assorted economic and demographic characteristics of rural counties in 1990, and relative changes in these
characteristics between 1990 and 2000, with these rural counties evenly subdivided according to whether they had low, medium, or high growth in their recent immigrant populations.
The table shows that high-growth rural counties employed
smaller shares in agriculture and other extractive industries
than those counties with less growth, although the decline in
agricultural employment over the decade also was lower in
high-growth counties. Otherwise, high-growth rural counties
employed slightly more in construction in 1990, fewer than
average in manufacturing (and the decline in manufacturing
over the decade was greatest), and more in services. This lesser
role of manufacturing might seem contradictory to the proﬁles
presented in this report. However, that the overall percentage
employed in manufacturing was lower and declined more precipitously in high-growth counties may reﬂect the infusion of
immigrant labor into a manufacturing sector that is otherwise
employing a declining number of native workers.

Table 2 also shows that populations in high-growth rural
counties were relatively better-oﬀ. They had the lowest rates
of public assistance receipt, poverty, and fewer residents
lacked a high school degree in 1990 and in 2000 (not shown).
Although they started the decade with lower rates of poverty
and public assistance use, declines over the 1990s, a decade
featuring a strong economy and welfare reform, were least
impressive in the high-growth counties. Finally, high-growth
rural counties had more working aged adults (aged 18–64),
fewer elders, and smaller overall declines in percentages under age 18 over the decade. This illustrates the rejuvenating
eﬀect that immigrants and their children can have on the local population. On balance, recent immigrants are settling in
places that were relatively privileged in 1990 (lower poverty,
lower welfare receipt, higher education), but improvements
in these indicators over the decade were least impressive in
high-growth counties. In addition, it should be cautioned that
diﬀerences in the indicators among the growth types are relatively modest.

Table 2. Characteristics of nonmetropolitan counties by relative growth in recent immigrant population (all cell
entries are percentages)
Recent
immigrant
population
change*

Assorted economic and demographic characteristics of counties in 1990 and 1990–2000 change in these characteristics
Employment in
agriculture/extraction

Employment in
construction

Employment in
manufacturing

Employment in
services

Public Assistance
receipt

1990

Change

1990

Change

1990

Change

1990

Change

1990

Change

Low

15.3

-27.9

6.4

12.5

17.3

-11.2

42.6

23.7

9.7

-60.6

Medium

12.0

-29.2

6.5

14.7

19.6

-11.5

42.6

23.5

9.4

-60.3

High

12.6

-27.1

7.1

14.1

17.3

-13.4

43.5

23.0

8.3

-51.3

Total

13.3

-28.0

6.7

13.8

18.0

-12.0

42.9

23.4

9.2

-59.2

Poverty rate

Completed adult education
less than high school

Age less than 18

Age 18–64

Age 65+

1990

Change

1990

Change

1990

Change

1990

Change

1990

Change

Low

19.8

-17.7

33.2

-26.7

27.1

-7.3

55.9

3.8

16.7

0.7

Medium

18.2

-17.0

32.1

-27.2

27.0

-6.5

56.6

3.7

16.2

-1.1

High

17.4

-12.6

31.6

-22.0

27.2

-5.1

57.4

3.0

15.4

-2.3

Total

18.5

-15.9

32.3

-25.3

27.1

-6.3

56.7

3.5

16.1

-0.8

* Nonmetropolitan counties were divided evenly into low, medium and high groups with respect to the change in their recent (post-1965) immigrant population, expressed
as a percentage of their total 1990 population. See data and methods section for more detail.
Source: 1990 and 2000 U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing, summary files.
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New Immigrants in Rural America:
A Demographic Snapshot
Evidence suggests that the movement of immigrant groups
to rural and small town America is new, real, and having an
impact, both positive and negative, on localities. But just who
are these new arrivals, and how do they compare with the native population? Using data from a nationally representative
household survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, we
compare the recent immigrant population (foreign-born who
arrived since 1965), and the very recent immigrant population
(those arriving since 1990), with the native-born population
(including those born abroad of native-born parents). I make
these comparisons for the nation as a whole, and separately by
place of residence, with a focus on nonmetropolitan areas.4

New Immigrants Are More Likely to be
18–64-Year-Old Adults
Compared with natives, the foreign-born are more likely to
be aged 18–64 rather than children or elders (see Figure 1).
For example, about 12 percent of natives are aged 65 or more,
while only 3.2 percent of the foreign-born who arrived since
1990 are elderly. And while 28 percent of the native-born are
under age 18, only 11 and 20 percent of post-1965 and post1990 arrivals, respectively, are children and youth. More of
the foreign-born in rural than urban areas are children, and
fewer are elderly. This stands in direct contrast to the residential pattern for natives, where there is a greater prevalence of
elders in the countryside than in metro America. It should
be borne in mind that these ﬁgures do not count as immigrants the native-born children of the foreign born, that is,
the second generation. Clearly their social and economic circumstances and trajectories will have a bearing on the overall
impact of immigration on the United States. It is noteworthy
in this regard that foreign-born women have higher levels of
fertility than natives. Data from the June supplement of the
2004 Current Population Survey indicate that the number of
births per 1,000 ever-married women aged 15-44 was 73.3
among natives and 91.6 among the foreign born. For Hispanic women this fertility measure stood at 100.3.

4

Data for central cities of metropolitan areas are provided for comparison
since cities do remain the predominant place of residence for recent immigrants. The focus of the discussion is on immigrants in nonmetropolitan
areas. See data and methods section for details on the CPS, deﬁnitions of
place of residence and other variables, and other analytic details.

Figure 1: Age distribution among natives, post-1965, and
post-1990 arrivals
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Figure 2: Race/ethnic distribution among natives,
post-1965, and post-1990 arrivals
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Many New Immigrants are Hispanics from Mexico
The vast majority of the native population is non-Hispanic
white, while immigrants are far more likely to be Mexican,
other Hispanic, and Asian. Figure 2 indicates that about
three-quarters of natives are non-Hispanic white, while only
about one in ﬁve recent immigrants are white. The makeup of
post-1965 and post-1990 arrivals is remarkably similar. Approximately 26 percent of recent immigrants are Mexican,
23 percent are other Hispanics, approximately 24 percent are
Asian, and approximately 7 percent are black.
There are, however, some important diﬀerences between
urban and rural immigrants. Most notably, rural immigrants
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are far more likely to be Mexican (48 percent of all post-1965
immigrants in rural areas) compared with only about 25 percent in urban areas. As a result, approximately two-thirds of
recent immigrants in rural areas are Hispanic while slightly
less than one-half of immigrants in urban areas are Hispanic. Recent immigrants to urban locales are more likely to be
Asian or of African descent.

Recent Immigrants Are Often Married
Marital status is a clear factor in individual and family wellbeing. Indeed, recent antipoverty initiatives have stressed
marriage as did the recent reauthorization of welfare reform
laws. As seen in Figure 3, about 75 percent of adult recent immigrants in rural areas are married, compared with less than
70 percent of recent immigrants generally, and approximately
64 percent of recent immigrants in central cities. The somewhat lower prevalence of marriage among native adults is due
to the fact that they are older and, therefore, more likely to
be widowed. Not surprisingly, being younger, new immigrant
adults, recent arrivals in particular, are more likely than native
adults to have never married. However, recent immigrants in
rural areas are much less likely than their counterparts elsewhere to have never been married, and are less likely to be
divorced or separated.

Figure 3: Marital status distribution among natives,
post-1965, and post-1990 arrivals
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Figure 4: Educational distribution among natives,
post-1965, and post-1990 arrivals
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New Immigrants Are at an Educational
Disadvantage but Not Less Skilled
Educational attainment is critical for success in the U.S. labor
market. Compared with natives, immigrants overall are more
likely to be either very poorly educated or very well educated
(see Figure 4). For example, while only about 14 percent of
native adults (aged 25+) have not completed high school,
more than one-third of post-1965 and post-1990 immigrants
have not completed high school. On the other hand, more
recent immigrants (26 percent) and very recent immigrants
(30 percent) have a college or higher degree compared with
approximately 25 percent of natives.
However, the picture diﬀers in rural areas. There, approximately one-half of all recent immigrant adults have not
completed high school. By contrast, only about one-third of
all recent immigrants, and less than 40 percent of those in
central cities, have such limited education. With respect to
college completion, while the most recent immigrants in rural areas are more likely to have completed college than their
native counterparts, they are far less likely to have done so
than either earlier immigrants overall or those residing in
central cities. The point is simple: new immigrants to rural
areas are at an educational disadvantage. This may be particularly problematic in small towns and rural areas that often
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have constrained budgets and limited personnel needed to
provide English as a Second Language (ESL) and other educational services to immigrant children. Again, the higher
fertility among immigrants noted above may compound the
problem. Even numerically modest immigrant inﬂows can
quickly stress local educational resources. To be sure, the rural disadvantage in immigrant education is likely a function
of the nature of job opportunities that attracted them in the
ﬁrst place. The many low-skilled jobs in rural areas often do
not require a high school degree.
While recent immigrants to rural areas are less well
educated, this does not necessarily mean they are unskilled.
A study of workers in Marshalltown, Iowa, ﬁnds that the
Hispanic workforce has a wide range of skills, often with
years of experience, in the domains of communications (e.g.,
telecommunications), construction (e.g., carpentry), industrial service (e.g., vehicle repair), and manufacturing (e.g.,
assembly) (Baker and Hotek 2003). Although less well educated, immigrant workers may bring a pool of human capital
that can contribute to the revitalization of rural economies.

24

Recent Immigrants Are More Likely to be
Employed
Recent immigrants, particularly those residing in rural areas,
are more likely than their native counterparts to be employed
and, in this sense, “playing by the rules.” Figure 5 indicates
that almost two-thirds (65 percent) of the foreign-born population (aged 18–64) who have arrived since 1965 and who
are residing in rural areas are employed (either full- or parttime). This compares with 62 percent of immigrants arriving
since 1990 and 56 percent of rural natives. The labor force
participation rates for both groups of immigrants (recent
and very recent arrivals) in central cities are lower, by about
4 percentage points. Although modest, these diﬀerences suggest that recent immigrants to rural areas, more so than their
counterparts elsewhere, are seeking to make a living through
formal employment.

More Recent Immigrants Work in Agriculture
Than Natives
Overall, only 2 percent of the population is employed in agricultural industries in the United States (Figure 6). Recent
immigrants are more than twice as likely as natives to be so
employed. Of course, rural residence and farming are not
synonymous. Nonetheless, the prevalence of agricultural
work is far greater in rural America, and here recent immigrants are strikingly more likely to be employed in agriculture
than their native counterparts—nearly 14 percent of recent
immigrant versus slightly more than 5 percent of native-born
rural workers.

Figure 5: Employment status among natives, post-1965, and
post-1990 arrivals by place of residence
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Figure 6: Percent employed in agriculture among natives,
post-1965, and post-1990 arrivals by place of residence
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Recent Immigrants May Be Employed, But Many
Are Underemployed
The data in Figure 5 points to a solid attachment to the labor
force among recent immigrants residing in rural America.
Clearly, attachment to the labor force is key to economic adaptation and success for immigrant groups. However, simply
being in the labor force does not guarantee success. Individuals, for example, may technically be in the labor force but underemployed. This group includes (1) the unemployed: those
not working but looking for work, (2) discouraged workers:
those out of a job and not looking for work, but who would
like a job if they thought they could ﬁnd one, (3) involuntary part-time workers: those working part-time only because
their employer(s) cannot provide full-time hours; and (4) the
working poor: those whose wages (adjusted for weeks and
hours worked) are insuﬃcient to lift them signiﬁcantly out
of poverty. All other workers are considered adequately employed (see Jensen and Slack 2003).
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Figure 7: Underemployment among natives, post-1965, and
post-1990 arrivals by place of residence
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Figure 7 shows the prevalence of underemployment, and
indicates a clear disadvantage for recent immigrant workers,
particularly those arriving since 1990. This disadvantage is
greatest for recent arrivals to rural areas. Nationally, about
12 percent of native workers are underemployed, compared
with 19 percent of post-1965 immigrants and 23 percent of
those who have arrived since 1990. The rates for recent immigrants in rural areas are signiﬁcantly higher; 24 percent of
post-1965 immigrants and 29 percent of those who arrived
since 1990 are underemployed. (Nearly 14 percent of very
recent immigrant workers in rural areas are working poor.)
Thus, although rural immigrants are more likely to work, the
adequacy of their employment is noticeably worse.

Figure 8: Poverty and near-poverty rates (%) among
natives, post-1965, and post-1990 arrivals by place of
residence
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Recent Immigrants Are More Likely to be in
Poverty or Near Poverty Than Urban Counterparts
A more direct measure of economic deprivation is poverty, as
deﬁned by the federal poverty thresholds. In 2005, the poverty threshold for a family of four with two adults and two children was $19,806. Figure 8 examines both the poor (income
below the poverty threshold) and the near-poor (income less
than 150 percent of poverty thresholds).
Both recent and very recent immigrant groups have higher
poverty rates (by either deﬁnition) than their native-born
counterparts. Immigrants residing in rural areas have higher
poverty rates than their counterparts living elsewhere, even
those in central cities where poverty rates generally are high.
This rural disadvantage is particularly apparent in the nearpoverty rates. Among very recent immigrants (those arriving
since 1990), 48 percent were poor or near-poor in rural areas
compared with 43 percent in central cities, and 39 percent
among all such recent immigrants. Clearly, the most recent
immigrants to rural America are at the highest risk for poverty.

Although Recent Immigrants May Be Poor, They
Are Less Likely to Receive Food Stamps
As the history of immigration outlined above reveals, the admission of impoverished immigrants has long been a point of
contention and contradiction in America. On the one hand,
the nation prides itself on being a haven for “the tired and
the poor,” to paraphrase the famous poem by Emma Lazarus
etched into the Statue of Liberty. On the other, those deemed
likely to become public charges have long been excluded by
immigration policy. At issue then is not the admission of the
poor per se, but rather the admission of those likely to burden
social welfare systems. Figure 9 shows the percentage of individuals in households receiving food stamps by nativity and
place of residence. The ﬁgure shows prevalence of receipt for
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Figure 9: Total and near-poor food stamp receipt rates (%)
among natives, post-1965, and post-1990 arrivals by place
of residence
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the total population (blue), as well as the receipt rate among
the near-poor (purple). Three items stand out. First, the rate
of receipt in the entire population diﬀers little by nativity
and residence, although receipt is lowest among recent immigrants in rural areas. Of course, the Food Stamp Program
is targeted to low-income individuals, so it is important to
examine the prevalence of receipt among those more likely
to be income eligible. A second important point, then, is that
food stamp receipt among the near-poor is decidedly lower
among recent immigrants than natives. About 31 percent of
near-poor natives are in households receiving food stamps,
which compares with 20 percent of post-1965 and 18 percent
of post-1990 arrivals. Third, near-poor immigrants in rural
areas are about half as likely as their native counterparts to
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be receiving food stamps. In short, recent immigrants may be
poor, but they are less likely to use food stamps, especially in
rural areas. To the extent the nation values immigrants who
work to make it on their own, these ﬁndings suggest that new
immigrants to rural America come closer to that ideal.

Figure 10: Lives in a home that is owned (%) among natives,
post-1965, and post-1990 arrivals by place of residence
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Rural Immigrants Are More Likely to Own Their
Home than Their Urban Counterparts

��

Owning a home is an important measure of economic and
social success in America. For immigrants, in particular, it is a
clear marker of social and economic integration. Not surprisingly given their more limited economic means, years of residence within the United States, and youth, recent immigrants
overall are less likely than natives to own their own home.
Nearly three-fourths (72 percent) of natives own their home,
while fewer than one-half (45 percent) of all post-1990 immigrants, and fewer than one-third (31 percent) of those who
arrived since 1990 (see Figure 10) own their own home. Immigrants in rural areas are more likely than those elsewhere to
own their home. This is consistent with the higher prevalence
of home ownership in rural areas generally, but it serves to
underscore the eﬀorts of rural immigrants, even very recent
ones, to integrate themselves into the American system.
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Figure 11: Lives in a household with any health insurance
(%) among natives, post-1965, and post-1990 arrivals by
place of residence
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Recent Immigrants Are Likely to Report Good
Health but May Not Have Access to Health
Insurance

��

Post-1965 immigrants are less likely to claim excellent health
than natives (28 versus 35 percent, respectively), owing largely to the low percentages reporting excellent health among
those who arrived between 1965 and 1990. Given their relative youth, very recent immigrants are more likely to report
excellent health. This is not to deny that in some circumstances signiﬁcant health problems exist, as noted in Julie Ardery’s
description of Sullivan County, New York, earlier in this report. There are few signiﬁcant residential diﬀerences. Recent
immigrants do show a clear disadvantage relative to natives
with respect to access to health insurance, perhaps a reﬂection of being more likely to have jobs that do not oﬀer health
insurance beneﬁts. Figure 11 indicates that although more
than 80 percent of natives live in households with some form
of health insurance, only 63 percent of post-1965 arrivals, and
56 percent of post-1990 immigrants are in households with
any health insurance. It is noteworthy that rural immigrants
are less disadvantaged than their central city counterparts in
this regard. The health and health care use patterns of new
immigrants in rural America is an issue that bears watching
since, like education, even modest inﬂows of immigrants and
their children can stress rural health care systems.
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The Snapshot of Rural Immigrants
The picture of the recent immigrant population in rural
America diﬀers in important ways from recent immigrants
overall or those in cities. Rural immigrants are more likely to
be Hispanic (and of Mexican origin in particular); they are
less well-educated; they are more likely to be poor, but when
poor, less likely to receive Food Stamps; they are more likely
to be married; more likely to be working, but also underemployed; more likely to own their own home; and they may
be in better health and more likely to have access to health
insurance.
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Research and Policy Directions

United States immigration history tends to repeat itself.
The latter decades of both the 19th and 20th centuries were
marked by waves of immigration from poorer countries
bringing new and diﬀerent languages and cultures. Then as
now, these waves of immigration have sparked concern about
the social and economic impact on the country. And then as
now, these new immigrant groups have tended to settle in
America’s cities. However, in recent decades, a new chapter in
U.S. immigration history appears to be emerging. Immigrants
are lately dispersing from gateway cities and other urban centers. Although the majority of the foreign-born still live in the
nation’s cities, towns and small cities all over rural America
are now experiencing dramatic increases in immigrants. The
immigrants, largely Hispanic, appear to be drawn to employment opportunities ﬁrst and foremost, but also to the lower
costs of housing, good schools, and an environment that is
regarded as safe and peaceful.
Although there may be some reason for concern among
rural communities, given that compared with their urban
counterparts, recent immigrants in rural areas tend to be
poorer and less well educated, this group also brings some
comparative advantages: they are more likely to be working
(albeit more often underemployed), less likely to use welfare
programs when poor, more likely to be married, and more
likely to own their own homes. They also are more likely to
be Hispanic (and more speciﬁcally of Mexican), and thus are
bound by a common language. The reaction among long-term
residents to these inﬂuxes has been mixed, with some locals
reacting negatively out of concern for presumed detrimental
social and economic impacts, some reacting positively and
viewing these newcomers as a source of much needed revitalization, and a large number are simply ambivalent. Whether indeed the new arrivals are a bane or a blessing for rural
America depends on some blend of reality and perception.
That is, new arrivals to a place inevitably bring both good and
bad in reality, and natives might either perceive or not perceive these beneﬁcial and detrimental eﬀects. But one thing
is certain: rapid increases in immigrant populations will be
more acutely felt in rural than urban areas.

The Eﬀects of Immigration on Smaller Communities
Must Be Forefront in Policy Discussions
At this writing, Congress is embroiled in a debate over new
legislation that would address the problem of illegal or undocumented immigration to this country. This issue is as
complex as it is contentious, in part because it places various
interests (such as labor versus business) and values against
each another. It is noteworthy that the key issues of conﬂict,
employer sanctions, border security, and especially amnesty
for undocumented workers, are the same as those that fueled
debate over IRCA in the 1980s. The 1986 legislation itself followed a long and tortuous legislative process.
This report takes no position on the question of amnesty. It
does, however, oﬀer the more general caution regarding immigration policy: the eﬀects on localities must be at the forefront of concern. In other words, new federal immigration
law must recognize that the eﬀects of immigration are felt
acutely in places such as Hazleton, Pennsylvania, and Marshalltown, Iowa. Communities contend daily with the pressures that necessarily accompany rapid increases in populations. The smaller size of rural places and often more limited
resources and social services make them especially vulnerable
to the pressures from immigration. Should new legislation include an amnesty provision, governments at all levels should
be prepared for the possibility that legalized workers will be
freer to move to new destinations while also leaving behind a
vacuum in the labor force. The impact on rural communities
in this regard would warrant special scrutiny.
Funding Should be Used to Spur Collaboration across
Governments and within Communities
Rural communities will continue to diﬀer in their receptivity
to new arrivals. It may be more adaptive, however, to follow
Marshalltown’s example by taking active steps to minimize
immigration’s negative eﬀects and maximize the beneﬁts.
National and state legislators should consider collaborating
with and supporting nongovernmental organizations that
are seeking to help rural immigrants and their communities
cope, adjust, and prosper. The federal government could also
provide funding to create incentives for local governments
to support programs that would bring immigrant and native
populations together in the joint task of community development and understanding.
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Expand Research on Rural Eﬀects of Immigration
Further research is needed to gain a better understanding of the nature, causes, and consequences of the ﬂow of
immigrants to rural and small-town America. In-depth,
coordinated, and systematic community studies using roughly
comparable research designs would provide critically needed
new evidence. Developing a typology of destinations would
be especially helpful and go beyond the valuable but parsimonious classiﬁcations currently in use (Kandel and Cromartie
2004). A coordinated series of studies would provide a clearer
understanding of ﬁscal impacts, the eﬀects of local context on
individual outcomes, and other critical issues with both macro and micro dimensions. For example, research might examine relations between recently arriving Latinos and the native
African American population in the rural Southeast. Cravey
(1997) has uncovered, for example, a highly stratiﬁed and
racialized division of labor in a small North Carolina town,
a division that newly arrived immigrants, themselves economically vulnerable, reinforce. This juxtaposition of rural
blacks, who endure chronic and concentrated poverty, with
new and principally Hispanic immigrants who likewise are
often poor or near-poor, bears special scrutiny by researchers
and policymakers alike.
Research should also explore more fully the range of
reasons why migrants are moving to rural locales, and their
relative importance and implications. At the same time,
longitudinal analyses of rural immigrants both within and
across immigrant generations would help document and
understand the pace and process of integration. As noted
by Martin, Fix, and Taylor (2006), although the focus has
justiﬁably been on immigrants themselves, it is the circumstances of their children that will be key to the ultimate
impact of immigration on rural communities.
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Data and Methods

The demographic portrait of recent immigrants in rural and
urban America is based on original analysis of data from the
March Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a nationally representative survey of approximately 50,000 U.S.
households and the individuals residing within them conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau on behalf of the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. To increase the cases available for analysis, I pooled data from the 1996–2003 CPS surveys and used
the outgoing rotation groups, such that any given sampled
household is incorporated in this analysis only once. Data are
weighted by the March supplement weight for a given year.
I used the CPS rather than public use micro data ﬁles of the
Census 2000 because this set of surveys includes key indicators not included on the census long form (e.g., those needed
to deﬁne underemployment).
Place of residence is deﬁned using the federal government’s
designation of metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties.
Metropolitan (metro) counties consist essentially of one or
more urbanized areas (e.g., cities) with a population of 50,000
or more, plus surrounding counties tied economically to the
central county via commuting patterns. The 1990 metropolitan deﬁnitions are used with CPS surveys analyzed here. I further identiﬁed residents who are living in the central cities of
metro areas, given that central cities are a popular destination
for immigrants to the United States. I use the terms “rural”
and “nonmetropolitan” interchangeably, often preferring the
former given that it is more readily understood. “Urban” here
means “metropolitan,” which includes both central cities and
their surrounding metropolitan suburbs. It should be noted
that counties (e.g., in the Central Valley of California) can
be both metropolitan and heavily agricultural, and there are
many nonmetropolitan counties in which agricultural activity is negligible. Stated simply, rural and farming are far from
synonymous. Also, a county might be metropolitan by virtue
of having an urbanized area that meets oﬃcial criteria, but
also have vast swaths of open country dotted by very small
settlements. The point here is, metropolitan counties can, and
often do, have areas that most observers would regard as rural.
With respect to nativity, I deﬁned the foreign-born as those
not born in the United States (excluding those born abroad of
American parents). I sometimes use the term immigrants for
this foreign-born population, with the caveat that some foreign-born individuals (e.g., international students) are legal

residents on temporary visas and have no intention of becoming permanent residents. I further distinguished between the
foreign-born population that arrived after 1965 (“recent immigrants”) and after 1990 (“very recent immigrants”). Note
that these categories are therefore not mutually exclusive.
Those who arrived after 1965 include that subset of foreignborn individuals who arrived after 1990.
It should be stressed that this is a national-level portrayal
of new immigrants in rural and urban areas. Such highly aggregated analyses necessarily gloss over the unique and important population proﬁles that can characterize immigrant
ﬂows to particular localities. Moreover, since the CPS sample
weights are tied to the decennial census, CPS data may not
accurately characterize populations in areas experiencing
high recent immigration. This is especially so in places where
the inﬂux has been composed disproportionately of undocumented individuals who tend to be less likely to respond to
formal questionnaires. Nevertheless, this analysis points to
ways in which new immigrants compare with natives nationally, and suggests potential diﬀerences of which more localized appraisals should be aware.
The section of the report that maps and describes
the places where new immigrants are settling is supported by
analysis of data from the summary ﬁles of the 1990 and 2000
U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing. The key variable
driving this analysis is the change between 1990 and 2000 in
the number of recent immigrants (foreign-born individuals
excluding those born abroad of American parents and regardless of citizenship, who arrived in the United States to
stay after 1965). Recognizing that a given absolute change can
have very diﬀerent eﬀects depending on whether the population of a county is large or small, I divided the change in
the recent immigrant population by the county’s 1990 total
population and multiplied by 100 to obtain a measure of relative change. A value of 5.0 for this variable can be interpreted
as the absolute increase in the recent immigrant population
expressed as a percentage of the 1990 population.
Map 2, which shows change in recent immigrant population for nonmetropolitan counties, uses the 2000 metropolitan area deﬁnitions. Further, to capture some of the clear
rural-urban variation that exists within nonmetropolitan
America, Table 1 diﬀerentiates between micropolitan counties and noncore counties, both of which are nonmetropoli-
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tan. Micropolitan counties are those with an urban cluster of
at least 10,000 persons (metro areas require an urban cluster
of 50,000+), plus contiguous counties linked to the central
county through commuting patterns. All other counties are
considered noncore. There are about twice as many noncore
counties (1,378) than micropolitan counties (674), but noncore counties have only about one-quarter the nonmetropolitan population. Maps of change in recent immigrant populations for metropolitan, micropolitan, and noncore counties
are available on request.

31

References
Baker, P. L. and D. R. Hotek. 2003. Perhaps a Blessing: Skills and
Contributions of Recent Mexican Immigrants in the Rural Midwest. Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 25(4):448-468.
Bouvier, L. F., and R. W. Gardner. 1986. Immigrants to the United States: The Unﬁnished Story. Population Bulletin, 41(4):1–50.
Cravey, A. J. 1997. The Changing South: Latino Labor and Poultry Production in Rural North Carolina. Southeastern Geographer, 37(2):295–300.
Crowley, M., D. T. Lichter, and Z. Qian. 2006. Beyond Gateway
Cities: Economic Restructuring and Poverty Among Mexican
Immigrant Families and Children. Family Relations, 55(3): 345–
360.
Davis, K. 1974. The Migrations of Human Populations. In G. Piel
et al. (Eds.), The Human Population, A Scientiﬁc American Book.
San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
Gouveia, L., and D. D. Stull. 1995. Dances with Cows: Beefpacking’s Impact on Garden City, Kansas and Lexington, Nebraska.
In D. D. Stull, M. J. Broadway and D. Griﬃth (Eds.), Any Way
You Cut It: Meat Processing and Small-Town America. Lawrence,
KS: University Press of Kansas.
Grey, M. A, and A. C. Woodrick. 2005. Latinos Have Revitalized Our Community: Mexican Migration and Anglo Responses
in Marshalltown, Iowa. In V. Zúñiga, and R. Hernández-León
(Eds.), New Destinations: Mexican Immigration in the United
States. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Hansen, M. L. 1940. The Immigrant in American History. New
York: Harper & Row.
Jensen, L. 1989. The New Immigration: Implications for Poverty
and Public Assistance Utilization. New York: Greenwood Press.
Jensen, L., and T. Slack. 2003. Underemployment in America:
Measurement and Evidence. American Journal of Community
Psychology, 32(1/2):21–31.
Jones, M. A. 1960. American Immigration. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Kandel, W., and J. Cromartie. 2004. New Patterns of Hispanic Settlement in Rural America. Rural Development Research Report
No. 99. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture.
LeMay, M. C. 2004. U.S. Immigration: A Reference Book. Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.
Lichter, D. T., and K. M. Johnson. 2006. Emerging Rural Settlement Patterns and the Geographic Redistribution of America’s
New Immigrants. Rural Sociology, 71(1): 109–131.

Logan, J. R. 2003. America’s Newcomers. Albany, NY: Lewis
Mumford Center for Comparative and Urban Regional Research. http://mumford1.dyndns.org/cen2000/NewComersReport/NewComer01.htm
Martin, P., and E. Midgley. 2003. Immigration: Shaping and Reshaping America. Population Bulletin, 58(2).
Martin, P., M. Fix, and J. E. Taylor. 2006. The New Rural Poverty.
Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.
Martin, P., and J. E. Taylor. 2003. Farm Employment, Immigration, and Poverty: A Structural Analysis. Journal of Agricultural
and Resource Economics, 28(2): 349–363.
Mayo-Smith, R. 1980. Emigration and Immigration: A Study in
Social Science. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Portes, A., and R. L. Bach, 1985. Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States. Berkeley, CA: The University
of California Press.
Samora, J., J.A. Bustamente, and G. Cardenas. 1971. Los Mojados: The Wetback Story. South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University
Press.
Singer, A. 2004. The Rise of New Immigrant Gateways. The Living
Cities Census Series. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Taylor, J. E., P. Martin, and M. Fix, 1997. Poverty Amid Prosperity: Immigration and the Changing Face of Rural California.
Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.
Stephenson, G. M. 1926. A History of American Immigration:
1820–1924. Boston: Ginn and Co.
Vialet, J. C. 2002. A Brief History of U.S. Immigration Policy. In
T. B. Gunderson (Ed.), Immigration Policy in Turmoil. New York:
Nova Science Publishers.

32

About the Author
Leif Jensen is a Professor of Rural Sociology and
Demography at The Pennsylvania State University where
he has been on the faculty since 1989. From 2003 to 2006 he
also served as Director of the Population Research Institute
at Penn State. He completed his M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in
Sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and his
undergraduate training in Sociology at the University of
Vermont. Dr. Jensen’s research interests are found within three broad areas. The ﬁrst is social stratiﬁcation with
emphasis on issues of poverty, employment, and household
economic strategies in rural and urban areas. The second
is demography with special attention to migration and immigration. The third is the sociology of economic development with a focus on Latin America. His recent and ongoing
research projects include studies of underemployment in the
United States, the movement of immigrant groups to new
destination communities in the U.S., the circumstances of
youth in migrant farm worker families in Pennsylvania, and
patterns of spatial inequality in Latin America. This work has
been supported by grants from the USDA, NIH, The Russell
Sage Foundation, and other sources.

About the Contributor
Julie Ardery, a Ph.D. sociologist, has written about
American culture and art for The American Prospect, Texas
Monthly, the Texas Observer, and American Craft. Her book
The Temptation, about the fascination of aﬄuent Americans
for folk art, was published in 1998 by University of North
Carolina Press.

33

Building Knowledge for Rural America’s
Families and Communities in the 21st Century

About the Carsey Institute
The Carsey Institute at the University of New Hampshire
conducts research and analysis on the challenges facing
rural families and communities in New Hampshire, New
England, and the nation.
The Institute sponsors independent, interdisciplinary
research that documents trends and conditions in rural
America, providing information and analysis to policymakers, practitioners, the media, and the general public.
Through this work, the Carsey Institute contributes to
public dialogue on policies that encourage social mobility,
strengthen the middle class and build healthy, sustainable communities. The Institute also provides analytical
resources to nonproﬁts working to improve family and
community well-being.
The Carsey Institute was established in May 2002 through
a generous gift from alumna and noted television producer
Marcy Carsey.

Cover photo by Julie Ardery.
This report is printed on 30% recycled paper (inside) and 50%
recycled paper (cover) and printed with soy-based inks.

www.carseyinstitute.unh.edu

34

Building Knowledge for
Rural America’s Families
and Communities in the
21st Century
Carsey Institute
University of New Hampshire
Huddleston Hall
73 Main Street
Durham, New Hampshire
03824-3563
603-862-2821
603-862-3878 (fax)
www.carseyinstitute.unh.edu

